Part VII: Faulty Foundations, Faulty Results

The structures of aggression between the two superpowers created a cycle that hurt the growth of commercial nuclear energy worldwide: competition between the countries created waves of atomic weapons proliferation, which in turn led to tightened restrictions on nuclear data, hurting the transfer of technologies. While Atoms for Peace created broad and relatively long-lasting interest in and openness to commercial nuclear energy throughout the 1950s to the 1970s, as nuclear proliferation grew during the same period, both superpowers became warier of each other once again in the late 1970s. In 1947, the United States had 250 operational nuclear weapons in its stockpiles. By 1960, that number had grown to 18,000. Similarly, the Soviets’ serial production of tactical nuclear weapons began in 1947 with their increased production sites and mining for enriched uranium. Indeed, in the 1960s and 1970s, concerns over nuclear weapons proliferation emerged again—atomic weapons were tested by China and France, India conducted a successful explosion in 1974, and Israel continued to hide vague developments. In 1968, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was created and began to accept signatures. The agreement then entered into force in 1970. Article 3 of the treaty stated it was the responsibility of participant countries to allow for the monitoring of their nuclear programs, both civilian and military. Therefore, the IAEA began to execute “safeguard agreements” with the countries. The safeguards outlined the scope and mechanism of the IAEA’s access to declared nuclear sites; the agreements were of the same nature as before, but on a bigger scale, with bigger stakes. Due to the nuclear-capable countries’ unwillingness to fully and transparently open their reactor sites to IAEA inspections, as well as the superpowers’ structure of competition for military dominance, commercial nuclear technology transfer once again suffered. The period from 1970 through the mid-1850s saw a reemergence of emphasis on nuclear export controls from the United States. The transparency and openness of the 1950s were now products of a bygone era; to win the nuclear arms race and prevent the Soviets from obtaining any sort of atomic information, the pendulum regarding data and technologies began swinging to more restrictions in the 1970s.

American commercial nuclear aid to Germany and Japan incited protests that contributed to the decline of commercial atomic power due to their association with nuclear weapons and military domination from the United States. Throughout Atoms for Peace, the United States did not simply attempt to win over hearts and minds through showy exhibitions and the distribution of pamphlets; the giving of substantial aid to American allies in the form of technological and financial support also played a large role in the commercial nuclear energy boom. However, growing American involvement in foreign nuclear sectors and widespread global proliferation caused increased disenchantment with forms of peaceful atomic technology. By the late 1970s, the Japanese state began to set limits on re-militarisation and sought to minimize its association with nuclear weapons as far as practicably possible. During the same period, anti-nuclear protests from the Japanese people also became prevalent and had the underlying message of also being anti-American capitalism and influence. Indeed, despite the allure of the exhibitions from the IAEA and Atoms for Peace, anti-nuclear protests continued as a feature of the Japanese social landscape for some years. Events developed at a similar rate in West Germany as well. At first, even beyond the Atoms for Peace campaign, nuclear power was relatively popular in the country—it gave Germany the capability to grow its economy and acted as the post-war measure of its power and strength. However, public opinion on commercial nuclear energy began to deteriorate in the late 1970s. At that time, NATO established its dual-track decision, which maintained that Berlin could start arms reduction negotiations with the Soviets while simultaneously stationing additional nuclear weapons in Europe. Massive protests erupted in Bonn and all over Germany against the stationing of those weapons. Unfortunately, commercial plants were unable to escape their association with nuclear weapons—protestors at German plants cited the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident in the United States as proof of the “evilness” of all nuclear technologies, whether commercial or military. The growing opposition towards commercial nuclear power drew from multiple features of general nuclear power technology. In some cases, notably West Germany, the connection of civilian atomic power to nuclear weapons through the production of plutonium was an important issue raised by the opposition. Indeed, as nuclear stockpiles around the world increased in the second half of the 1980s, anti-commercial nuclear sentiment among the West German public reached an all-time high, and protests became commonplace across the country.