Part VI: Case Study During the Pivot — West Germany

Although ideologically aligned with the United States, West Germany engaged in vital nuclear energy diplomacy with the Soviet Union beginning in the late 1960s because of America’s restrictive practices, the success of Ostpolitik and geographic proximity, and the relatively relaxed attitude of the United States due to détente. In May of 1945, Germany surrendered unconditionally to the Allied powers, thus ending World War II in Europe. The Allies decided to occupy Germany militarily—the United States, Britain, and France occupied zones in the west, while the Soviets occupied the east. However, in late 1946, “Bizonia” was formed as a merger of the American and British zones. Soon after, the French zone was also included, and the three zones transitioned to a common currency named the Deutsche Mark. The currency reform effectively rendered the previous currency, the Reichsmark, worthless in Eastern Germany. In response, the Soviets closed Berlin to Western access, and the de facto split between East and West in Germany began to crystallize. In 1949, Germany formally split into two separate nations—the Federal Republic of Germany (FDR or West Germany), allied to the Western bloc, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany), allied to the Soviet Union. Between 1949 and 1961, around 2.5 million East Germans fled from East to West Germans; the loss of skilled workers, professionals, and intellectuals threatened to destroy the economic viability of the state. In response, East Germany built a barrier to close off access between the East and West. The barrier, named the Berlin Wall, was first erected on the night of August 12, 1961. By the 1980s, a system of walls, electrified fences, and fortifications extended 28 miles through Berlin and extended a further 75 miles around West Berlin, separating it from the rest of East Germany.

When discussing events relating to West and East Germany during the late-1960s to late-1970s, it is crucial to keep in mind the broader effects of détente and Ostpolitik. Détente—the easing of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union—began in 1969 as a core element of the foreign policy of President Richard Nixon. Similarly, in 1969, Willy Brandt, the chancellor of West Germany, launched the new policy of Ostpolitik, which aimed to improve relations between West Germany and Eastern Europe. Many historians view 1973 as a turning point in relations between West Germany and the Soviet Union, as the oil crisis stemming from the Arab-Israeli War forced West Germany to accept oil and natural gas from the Soviets; some even claim that it would be counterfactual to argue that energy trade between the East and the West would have flourished if the oil crisis of 1973 had never taken place. Indeed, when Brezhnev visited West Germany in May 1973, he regarded the new pipeline connecting the Soviet Union and West Germany as the first guarantor of a long-term partnership; he stated that "once this has been completed, cooperation shall be secured for 30, even 50 years." In reality, however, it is incredibly important to realize that before the oil crisis of 1973, the Soviet Union was already a much-desired nuclear trading partner due to its geographical and cultural proximity. West Germany had begun to emerge as the Soviet Union’s primary Western trading partner as early as 1969 due to Ostpolitik. In 1972, new contracts expanded the pipeline business, and by 1973, oil exports to West Germany had tripled. However, it remains true that the 1973 oil crisis expedited East-West cooperation and was the cause for a myriad of plans that intended to connect the two sides through their energy transport systems. These systems were not only restricted to the famous gas pipeline installed in West Germany but also involved nuclear energy and oil supplies.

Up until the early 1970s, West Germany had received enriched uranium from the United States as part of their Atoms for Peace campaign. However, in 1972, America began to impose stricter trading conditions for uranium supplies to Western Europe, partially due to recurring fears of atomic secrets being leaked to the Soviets. In previous years, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin had already offered uranium enrichment services on more favorable terms to West Germany. Therefore, in March of 1973, the West German energy supplier, Euratom Supply Agency, began discussions with Moscow about purchasing "basic equipment" for a nuclear power plant to be built in Mühlheim. According to West German officials involved, these talks proceeded "to everyone's utter satisfaction," and successfully negotiated contracts for the purchase of uranium to be used in nuclear power plants in Biblis and Neckarwestheim followed that same year. A West German official in the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology reported that they had "long been in support of unconditional trade regarding the enrichment of uranium in the Soviet Union." Although initially doubtful, the Foreign Office also concurred, since the United States had given its consent to the trade between the two countries under relaxed relations through détente. Thus, in 1974, the Soviets expanded their nuclear energy portfolio, suggesting that four nuclear power plants be built in West Germany to supply the country and West Berlin with electricity.

The second oil crisis in 1979 further bolstered cooperation between West Germany and the Soviet Union, though straining West Germany's relationship with the United States, as détente was entering its end stages. In the wake of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the ensuing oil crisis, West Germany continued to rely on expanding cooperation with the Soviet Union in the energy market. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt focused on utilizing atomic energy to minimize the impacts of the oil crisis—he promoted the building of nuclear reactors and even offered to export German nuclear power plants to the Soviet Union. In exchange, in 1980, the Soviet Union renewed its offer to export electricity to West Germany as long as the West would provide the power plants. Cooperation with the Soviet Union on atomic energy continued through the 1980s—the Soviets supplied enriched uranium to West Germany, France, and Italy, while Western European firms provided nuclear reactor components to the Soviets.