Part III: Change in Perspective: a Pivot

Although the United States did indeed help install commercial nuclear energy internationally through Atoms for Peace, the easing of restrictions on information sharing was driven by the need to compete with the nuclear-capable Soviet Union. When Dwight D. Eisenhower took office in 1953, the Soviet Union had already successfully tested atomic weapons. Although nuclear weapon proliferation remained a strong concern, as Eisenhower’s Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated, there was no longer a way to securely “dam…the flow of information.” As a result, 1953 marked a pivot in the United State’s atomic energy strategy. On December 8th Eisenhower gave the “Atoms for Peace” speech in front of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, stating:

The United States knows that peaceful power from atomic energy is no dream of the future. Who can doubt, if the entire body of the world’s scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable material with which to test and develop their ideas, that this capability would rapidly be transformed into universal, efficient, and economic usage?

Eisenhower, seeing that the spread of nuclear technology, both civilian and military, was inevitable, launched a campaign for the United States to act as the main proponent for the spread of peaceful usage of nuclear power. Atoms for Peace proposed programs that would supply equipment and information to schools, hospitals, and research institutions within the United States and throughout the world. However, Eisenhower was not acting solely out of the best interests of nations that had little to no experience with nuclear technologies. A National Security Council Report from March of 1955 concluded that:

The national resource represented by U.S. atomic facilities and technology can be a great asset in the effort to promote a peaceful world compatible with a free and dynamic American society. U.S. determination to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy, with calculated emphasis on a peaceful atomic power program abroad as well as at home, can generate free world respect and support for the constructive purposes of U.S. foreign policy. Such a program will strengthen American world leadership and disprove the Communists’ propaganda charges that the U.S. is concerned solely with the destructive uses of the atom. Atomic energy, which has become the foremost symbol of man’s inventive capacities, can also become the symbol of a strong but peaceful and purposeful America.

Although Atoms for Peace was indeed designed for the propagation of peaceful nuclear technologies, Eisenhower was also afraid that “world acceptance of U.S. leadership in the peaceful use of atomic power may be endangered by the USSR…in the near future.” Therefore, the acceleration of United States programs and early tangible action in the international field was crucial to preserve America's leadership in the atomic field.

Similarly, the Soviet Union’s rapid development of its atomic program did not simply aim to boost national pride through technological advancement—it also sought to reduce the superiority of the United States in the atomic field. In 1954, the Soviets created their first nuclear reactor, and it sought to expand its international nuclear presence by exporting reactors to countries within its geographic presence. Indeed, it was understandable that the Soviets would also make the maximum use of atomic energy not only for military and industrial purposes, but also as political and psychological measures to gain the allegiance of uncommitted areas of the world, such as India, Pakistan, or Burma. If the United States fails to exploit its atomic potential, NSC 5507/2 concluded that the USSR could gain “an important advantage” in what was becoming a critical sector of the Cold War struggle. Therefore, to compete with the nuclear-capable Soviet Union, the United States proceeded vigorously with direct actions to demonstrate its resolve to assist other nations and maintain its world leadership in peaceful uses of atomic energy.

The creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency as an organization within the UN in 1957 is mainly accredited to Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech and the subsequent campaign by the United States for an increase in the usage of commercial nuclear energy. Between the late 1950s to the late 1970s, the IAEA sold and regulated fissile materials globally without very few problems, despite its subtle affiliations with the United States.

Beyond Atoms for Peace, the United States also adjusted domestic policies to counter the Soviet Union in commercial nuclear energy. In 1954, the United States adjusted the

previously restrictive Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to permit cooperation with other countries or groups of countries in atomic power development. Given the continued interests of the United States in ensuring its preeminence over the Soviet Union, the act still demanded that the President determine if “the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.” Nevertheless, the revision to the AEA promoted “nuclear technology and material exports if recipient countries committed not to use them to develop weapons.” The policy change led to the training of hundreds of foreign experts in academia and industry, as well as nuclear cooperation agreements with dozens of countries. Furthermore, the United States valued developing commercial nuclear power exceedingly, so it was willing to balance civilian programs with military ones, demonstrating the ability of commercial nuclear power to aid America internationally. Although the National Security Council initially called for research reactor programs to “not cause any significant diversion of that material or of trained personnel from the U.S. nuclear weapons program,” it soon allowed for programs for the peaceful utilization of fissionable materials to be harmonized with military needs. Indeed, as the United States reserve of nuclear weapons remained steady, fissile materials were increasingly devoted to power production.