Introduction: Secrecy, Influence, and Limitations

A black and white photograph of Vice President Harry S. Truman and President Franklin D. Roosevelt sitting side by side at a white table-clothed lunch was taken on August 18th, 1944. Despite his toothy grin, Truman was wholly unaware of the burgeoning development of the atomic bomb until his swearing-in as the 33rd President of the United States upon the death of Roosevelt. Most historians view the events of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as the hardest decisions that Truman faced in his eight-year presidential administration. However, it was a different decision entirely that plagued Truman throughout his time in office and would ultimately affect American nuclear policy for years to come. Keeping with the judgment of Roosevelt, Truman decided that all atomic information was to be kept secret from the Soviets, to be used to bargain with, leverage, or even possibly threaten the Soviet Union in the future. And thus, the treatment of the Soviet Union as a mortal enemy had begun before the alliance of World War II had even ended.

On August 1st, 1946, Truman signed the Atomic Energy Act surrounded by seven government officials hovering over him in various ties, from pinstripe to bow tie. The contents of the bill represented the air of paranoia that had infiltrated the American public. Yes, information sharing was now allowed, but in a severely restricted fashion—there remained no free scientific exchange. Yes, research was now conducted, but solely performed under the military—there existed no civilian control, even during peacetime. Yes, nuclear technologies were now manufactured, but the penalty for disclosing restricted data? Ten years in prison and a $100,000 fine. Despite attempts to separate civilian nuclear technologies from geopolitics, commercial nuclear power was unable to escape its shadowed association with the infamous mushroom cloud. That was until 1953.

On December 8th, 1953, President Dwight Eisenhower delivered his Atoms for Peace speech in front of the United Nations General Assembly, publicaly signifying a pivot away from secrecy in American atomic energy policy. And so, a propaganda campaign began. The United States Information Agency (USIA), also created in 1953, began producing a television series. Each episode’s opening touted “The Magic of the Atom” with bold, shimmery white letters exploding against a dark background. Every episode focused on a particular aspect: The Atom and Agriculture featured farming systems powered by atomic energy, The Atom and Industry demonstrated the inner workings of a nuclear power structure, and The Atomic City portrayed a serene small town that operated near a nuclear power plant. Above all, each episode made sure to emphasize the safety and peacefulness of all nuclear facilities.

Beginning in the 1970s, anti-nuclear protests were commonplace across Western Europe and Japan. Grainy photographs of armed guards bombarding civilian protesters splashed across the covers of magazines from The New York Times to The South China Morning Post. The same goal that drove the United States to embark on Atoms for Peace—competition with the Soviet Union—had backfired. The wary approach adopted by the United States towards their Soviet allies regarding the development of the atomic bomb set the stage for a bipolar Cold War. Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace campaign pivoted away from the original policy of secrecy in an attempt to compete with the Soviets and win over allies through the relinquishment of commercial nuclear technologies. However, the dissemination of commercial atomic energy ultimately slowed due to the association between nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants, which was caused by the competitive nature of the Cold War.